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Abstract
This paper addresses the problem of division of labour as an
evolutionary process in which co-ordinated agents attempt
problem-solving as a search in problem space. Co-ordination
stress and learning trigger adaptation but as complexity rises
radical solutions are sought prompting radical organisational as
well as technological change. The analytical issues involved are
further explored by resorting to the so-called NKC model of
evolution and co-evolution.
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21.  Path-dependence in organisational learning
Persistency of organisational diversity has received a considerable amount of
attention in the recent literature, and the application of some mathematical tools such as
Landscape Theory and Polya Urns in economic and organisational contexts has
permitted new promising results in the attempt to explain it. An interesting progress into
this direction has been accomplished when it has been suggested that sources of
diversity can be found in learning processes and in connected selection pressures being
characterised by path dependency and which may, therefore, give rise to a display of
diverse organisational forms.
When we refer to learning we have to distinguish at least two different and
opposite effects: on the one hand we have to consider micro-learning activity which is
the most important force to stabilise behaviour into repetitive patterns and which gives
rise to organisational inertia: internal rules of an organisation and the associated
routinised behaviour are maintained and repaired via this activity. On the other hand,
learning can be considered in its full and radical dimension: in this respect, it is the
force which allows organisations to jump from one configuration to another, internally
redefining their rules and behavioural patterns. It is this force which leads to radically
new division of labour.
Lock-in phenomena are the cornerstone of this distinction. In some experiments,
which we will briefly discuss below, different groups, exposed to a different context
have been induced to discover different sets of behavioural rules: the discovery has
shown high persistency, a sort of "imprinting" which induces two groups to react in
very different ways when exposed to the same configuration. This lock-in effect
explains organisations’ "cognitive inertia". Our starting viewpoint is that a fruitful way
to analyse the division of labour is to consider it a process of co-operative innovation. In
consequence we recur to models extracted from biological and evolutionary contexts in
order to represent this process.
2. A general overview on routinised behaviours, problem solving and division of
labour
Routinised behaviour can be considered as the building block of division of
labour, and our working hypothesis is that to explain how new forms arise we need to
understand two important: organisational inertia and path-dependency. For these
reasons it is useful to revisit carefully the notion of routinised behaviour. A consolidated
tradition exists – in the domain of computation theory – which considers routines to be
computable programmes which can be represented by a set of condition-action rules. It
is obvious that in social sciences strong resistance can arise against considering humans
involved in a routinised activity as pure automata. The question amounts to
understanding to what extent it is possible to attribute routinised behaviour to human
beings.
Psychological studies (Luchins, 1942) are quite important for the comprehension
of routinised individual behaviour. As this literature has emphasised, this behaviour is
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individuals to save on mental efforts. To avoid any confusion, we make reference to
routinised behaviour (instead of routines) in order to indicate complex collective
repetitive patterns of actions. The point at issue here is to see to what extent the
representation of human behaviour in terms of rule-based activities can be used in the
context of co-operation and co-ordination among different individuals. Consider the
following points.
1. We must accept that in a co-operative context a micro-learning activity is normally
at work, and consider situations in which an individual's activity is fully routinised,
i.e. covers all possible contingencies with memorised set of rules, as an extreme
case. Only in these extreme situations behaviours are fully mechanised, and the
learning process is inactive.
2. Call "co-ordination rules" the rules which embody mutual relationships, i.e.
prescribe actions which are compatible with the actions performed by the partners.
Co-ordination rules are largely interiorised by individuals, who do not need detailed
and specific orders to realise the co-ordinate task. If an unexpected condition arise,
it follows either a conflict among rules or the lack of rules, and co-ordination fails.
A machine cannot work in these conditions, while men's reaction is typically to find
a solution, i.e. start learning and exploring in the space of rules.
3. The previous observations suggest that a fully routinised activity is possible, or at
least more likely to happen, when tasks are performed by isolated individuals
(Weisberg (1980)). In co-ordinated processes, in fact, purely routinised behaviours
would require taking into account other actors’ actions, including errors and
conflicts, which require deliberation and learning: interactions normally are
exponentially increasing with the number of participants.
4. Purely routinised collective behaviours are rather difficult to realise because, to
cover any possible contingency, they require a huge set of rules governing the
interactions among actors: this is the equivalent of complete markets with rational
expectations in general equilibrium theory. We claim that there are limits to the
complexity of the set of rules that can be activated by boundedly rational actors.
Beyond this threshold, reasoning cannot be substituted by purely automatic
behaviour.
March and Simon (1958) claim that the process of division of labour can be
modelled as a process of collective problem solving ; in fact problem solving activity
can be represented as search in problem space; and the search process is normally
realised by means of a recursive division of problems into sub-problems the outcome of
which is division of labour. We add two observation to this viewpoint : First, this view
implies that the outcome of a problem solving process performed by a team is not only a
new division of labour but also a new way to co-ordinate the divided parts; co-
ordination is the complementary part of the division of labour which follows the
4realisation of a project; the further the division of labour proceeds, the more the
different divided parts require co-ordination and the more information becomes
dispersed. Second, this process is not deterministic, but highly conjectural and
uncertain. In fact when a problem has been decomposed in a set of sub-problems,
generally not all of the sub-problems will be immediately solvable and, consequently,
they will, in turn, be decomposed into simpler ones. Decomposition then recursively
proceeds until all the "relevant" sub-problems have been solved. The procedure "by
decomposition" is therefore a conjectural one : a) there is no set of decomposition rules
which a priori allows agents to achieve a certain result and b) agents can verify the
solvability of the original problem only when all the "relevant" sub- problems have been
solved.
This way of solving problems is characteristic of projecting and planning
activities inside organisations: first a task is drawn up, on the presumption that it is
feasible, then the main task is decomposed into different functional parts. This division
proceeds recursively until every part of the project has been recognised as feasible.
3. The observational and experimental level
If we assume individuals as capable of forming an internal mental representation
of the situation, based on symbols and their manipulation, experiments must be devised
to confirm or refute this approach not only at the behavioural level but also at the level
of involved mental models. This can be done, beyond the experiments on the
Einstellung effect, with a sophisticated use of the methods of experimental psychology.
It is useful to emphasise that this level -rule interiorisation, memorisation, etc. - is at
least partially observable. Problems in classical Expected Utility theory began when,
with the experiments of Maurice Allais, and later of Kahnemann and Tversky, it became
possible directly to confirm or refute a large number of propositions claimed by the
theory. The same holds for the empirical analysis of other mental activities involved in
human behaviour, like reasoning and problem solving. Therefore the more the methods
of experimental psychology advance, the easier is to verify on empirical grounds
whether routinised behaviour in the real world is or is not rule-based, and more
generally to what extent individuals act on the basis of an internal model of the world.
One of the limits of the standard psychological method of experimentation is that it is
based on direct individuals’ responses (see for example protocol analysis), and therefore
does not take into account knowledge partial opaqueness and actors’ partial
unawareness.
One alternative experimental device, which allows experimenters to move beyond
these limits by taking into account the opaqueness of individual's knowledge, has been
realised by creating an artificial context for collective action: a computer game in which
many agents must cooperage to achieve a common goal, without being submitted to
verbal tests. This artificial game has been created by Cohen and Bacdayan (1994) and
permits to explore the emergence of rules of co-ordination without involving players'
verbal competence. Since the authors provide a detailed description of the rules of the
Target the Two (TTT) game, it will only be briefly introduced here. The deck consists
5of 6 cards: 2♣ 3♣ 4♣ and 2♥ 3♥ 4♥. All six cards are used in each game. Each player
has one card and the other four are placed in four positions on the board named Target,
Up, DownC and DownN (see figure 1).
According to the rules of the game the problem is solved when 2♥ is placed in the
Target position by one of the players. This is the final goal and all the configurations
with 2♥ in Target are possible final configurations of the board. In order to solve the
game and put 2♥ in Target, players must take a series of intermediate steps. In the
configuration shown in Figure 1, for instance, one of players must find 2♥; moreover,
since neither of them can exchange 4♣ with 2♥, they must place another card in Target
which allows the final exchange with 2♥. For each configuration it is possible to
identify sequences of intermediate steps that must be accomplished to solve the game.
These sequences of intermediate steps can be conceived of as a decomposition of the
problem of the game (2♥ in Target) into sub-goals.
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Fig. 1
A graph (see figure 2) has been introduced in order to represent the space of sub-
goals for any possible configuration. This representation focuses only on the card
occupying the Target area and illustrates all possible transitions in the Target area
[Egidi 1994 pages 9-11]. Note that a change between two configurations of the Target
marked by horizontal lines is legally performed only by Numberkeepers, while a change
of configurations marked by vertical lines is available only to Colorkeepers. By using
the graph of sub-goals represented in Figure 2 it is possible to follow the progress of the
solution to a game and to keep track of the sequence of cards occupying the Target area
from the initial board to its solution. Reasoning backwards and given the rules of the
game, the only possible configurations that immediately precede the final one (that is
2♥ in Target) are those in which the Target position is occupied by either 3♥, or 4♥ or
2♣. In fact, because of the rules constraining the exchange with the Target, Colorkeeper
can end the game by exchanging his card (that is 2♥) with the card in Target only if
6they are of the same suit (that is 3♥ or 4♥). On the other hand, Numberkeeper is bound
by the "number" constraint, and if he has 2♥ in his hand and wants to end the game, the
exchange will be possible only if the card in Target is 2♣. Referring to Figure 2, the
final goal is in the lower right corner. The sub-goal to be accomplished in order to
achieve the final goal is to fill the Target position occupied by one of the cards that in
Figure 2 are immediately close to 2♥. Inspection of the graph of sub-goals clearly
shows the decomposable nature of the problem; in fact, if the Target is occupied either
3♣ or 4♣, it is necessary to put in Target either 3♥, or 4♥ or 2♣ and only afterwards try
to end the game. We call 2♣ the Colorkeeper's key-card, whereas 3♥ and 4♥ are named
Numberkeeper's key-cards. In general, the key-cards are the cards that a player can
exchange with a Target area occupied by either 3♣ or 4♣ in order to solve the game.
2♣
2♣
4♣
4♣
3♣
3♣
♥
♥
♥
♥
♥
♥
3
3
2
2
4
4
Nk
Ck Nk
Nk
Ck
Ck
Ck
Ck
Ck
Fig. 2
From an analytical point of view, by keeping track of the sequence of cards placed
in the Target position, it is possible to record the solution of the game in terms of the
sequence of sub-goals and goal that the pairs of players follow to solve the game. For
instance, the string 4♣ 2♣ 2♥ identifies a specific path in Figure 2 and a well defined
solution to the game: when the cards are dealt, the card in Target position is 4♣,
Colorkeeper eventually exchanges his card (2♣) with the Target, leaving Numberkeeper
to end the game. On the other hand, these paths may be also very long (e.g. 4♣ 3♣ 3♥
4♥ 4♣ 2♣ 2♥).
It is interesting to note that a division of labour gradually emerges. To see this,
notice that a strategy can be represented in summary form as a path in a sub problem
graph; or as a set of rules to trigger an action for every game configuration. With regard
to the TTT game, the 422 and 442 strategies can be described as paths in the problem
space; any possible path in the graph defines a sequence of sub-goals to be achieved in
order to solve the problem. This representation of a strategy does not mention specific
7moves, but gives the players directions about the goal to be achieved at each step There
are many different ways to realize the goals corresponding to every path in the graph.
For example, suppose that Colorkeeper plays a 422 strategy; he must search for his key-
card (2♣) and put it in Target area. In relation to the card distribution, 2♣ may be in
many different (covered or clear) positions on the board, and therefore the sequences of
actions corresponding to the same goal may differ considerably. As it is clear from the
last of the two figures, there are two different strategies to realize the goal when the card
in Target position is 3♣ or 4 ♣, strategies which we have called 442 and 422
respectively.
COLORKEEPER NUMBERKEEPER
Conditions Actions Conditions Actions
Hand Up Target 422 442 Hand Up Target 422 442
1 2♣ 2♥ 4♣ T U 4♥ 2♥ 4♣ U T
2 2♣ 4♥ 4♣ T C,N 4♥ 2♣ 4♣ C,N T
3 2♣ # 4♣ T C,N 4♥ # 4♣ C,N T
4 2♥ 2♣ 4♣ U P 2♥ 4♥ 4♣ P U
5 4♥ 2♣ 4♣ U C,N 2♣ 4♥ 4♣ C,N U
6 # 2♣ 4♣ U C,N # 4♥ 4♣ C,N U
7 2♥ 4♥ 4♣ C,N P 2♥ 2♣ 4♣ P C,N
8 2♥ # 4♣ C,N P 2♥ # 4♣ P C,N
9 # 2♥ 4♣ C,N U # 2♥ 4♣ U C,N
10 4♥ 2♥ 4♣ C,N U 2♣ 2♥ 4♣ U C,N
11 4♥ # 4♣ C,N C,N 2♣ # 4♣ C,N C,N
12 # 4♥ 4♣ C,N C,N # 2♣ 4♣ C,N C,N
13 # # 4♣ C,N C,N # # 4♣ C,N C,N
The experiment shows that if players use the same strategy, let say 442, whatever
the starting configuration, they perform in a suboptimal way in respect to “rational”
players who resort to both strategies optimally in accordance to the specific initial
configuration. Indeed, players become increasingly routinised and use the same
strategy. The typical feature of the two routinised strategies is that they disentangle
players’ action while keeping cooperation active : in fact, players cooperate without
using any information regarding their partner’s actions as they appear from the board
since strategies embody cooperation. Consider, finally, the table above which sets out
the two players’ condition action system.
This table fully defines the trait combination composed by the two players in the
sense that among a large variety of different alternative strategies, the table restricts
their choice to the two sub-optimal ones. The problem is to identify, within each table,
subsets of condition action strings which can be modified independently from the rest.
The number of independently definable subsets which compose the table is analogous to
the epistatic number in Kauffmann’ model.
8Action Conditions
Time T Time T-1 Time T-2
Ck's Ck's Nk's Ck's
Move  Hand Up Target Move Up Target Move Hand Up Target
N # # 4♣
C # # 4♣
N # # 4♣ # # 4♣ C # # 4♣
C # # 4♣ # # 4♣ N # # 4♣
Fig. 3
Just to give a precise example, consider situation 13 in the table above : Ck must
search a key card in order to accomplish his goal: the “subprogram” for search is a
subset of rules as described in figure 3.
It is clear that a local change in the subroutine described above, for example by
changing in the first row P instead of N, completely modifies the performance and the
capacity of the routine to fulfil the goal : in fact in this case the search process is no
longer complete and becomes therefore fully inefficient. Nevertheless, the other
subroutines maintain their efficiency and do not have to be modified in order to improve
the search process efficiency. This example gives, on the one hand, a clear idea of
independence in the subset of rules belonging to an actor’s set. On the other hand, it
becomes clear that an epistatic link arises between different players ; in fact, if player A
is unable to modify his search routine, player B can modify his own search process, by
including a new part to help A. This part prescribes simply to search and pass (by
putting it in the Up position) the card which is useful for the partner.
In summary, to achieve the final goal each player must discover his sub-goals, and
must co-ordinate his action with the partner's one. The game therefore involves division
of knowledge and co-operation among players, and gives rise to the emergence of
organisational routines. The game admits multiple sub-optimal solutions: a number of
different, locally optimal strategies, displayed in a rugged "landscape" of different
rewards (Egidi and Narduzzo, 1996).
4. Learning and innovation as an adaptive strategy
Experimental evidence about co-ordination and division of labour in artificial
contexts gives us interesting suggestions: largely non deliberate processes of distributed
organisational learning can take place within organisations, but there are evident
limitations to the possibility of learning co-operatively when the number of individuals
involved increases. Experiments suggest that beyond a certain limit, co-operating
requires a co-ordinating institution, for instance decisional hierarchies, or any co-
ordinating device. Can the features we have now sketched be captured by some more
formal model ? We suggest that the basic features of NKC Models (Kauffman 1989,
9Kauffman and Johnsen 1992) can provide a good basis to achieve this goal.
Even though this model has been developed mainly to study biological adaptation,
its relevance can be considered quite general and applicable to economic analysis and
organisational theory (Levinthal 1994). The basic assumption, which is critical but
fundamentally befitting human behaviour, is that individuals are characterised by
bounded rationality and that their problem solving activity can consequentially be
viewed as a local search in problem space. The issue that a model such as the one under
discussion is able to cope with is the increasing co-ordination difficulty encountered by
organisations, namely firms, as they carry out their activity and are therefore called
upon to face up to novel situations stemming from the very activity they perform. A
most notable situation of the kind described is when organisations react by resorting to
innovation. Activity in this context, for instance a functioning production process, can
be portrayed as a co-ordinated ensemble of specialised tasks. Specialisation at each
point in time is the outcome of problem solving which has led to specific knowledge.
Slightly more formally, we can order these tasks as a sequence of N elements. As
argued in more detail above, tasks cannot be completely routinised as an exhaustive and
all encompassing programme fitting all states of the world. Learning takes place, partial
routine repair occurs even in spite of strong hierarchical control; events which imply
that tasks lend themselves to a manifold performance. Thus, each such task can be
described by potentially different ways of execution, say under strong simplification, by
n different ways.
Innovation is a deliberate attempt of an organisation to improve its performance.
For simplicity’s sake, we will assume a very simple pristine production process.
Although, this view of a production system is entirely non-realistic and abstract, it may
possibly be of help to focus on the argument to add a somewhat historical flavour to the
case we wish to argue by imagining it as appropriate to a backward agricultural
economy at a stage zero of development : a still very rudimentary, subsistence economy
in which trade plays an insignificant role. In spite of its backwardness, this production
system is an economically and technologically functioning set-up which requires
specific knowledge and know-how (Ricottilli 1994). Seen in an evolutionary
perspective, it can be viewed as a process which generates division of labour as well as
implying it. Indeed, we may carry this observation further to assert that each production
process appears at every point in time as the result of problem solving which has
structured the task of producing something into specific phases. Each phase is, in fact,
the outcome of decomposition or, to be more explicit, of a process which has broken
down the original problem into sub-problems. It is the solution of such sub-problems to
be organised within specific production phases. In this paragraph, we wish to point out
some basic characteristics of the innovative search which takes place in such a
framework. To do so, it is convenient to look upon the notion of extant technique as an
organisational set up aimed at problem-solving by means of adequate problem-framing.
As argued above, complexity and co-ordination difficulties warrant an organisational
solution thanks to which sub-problems, or sub-tasks, may be more appropriately
addressed in relative independence so as to focus at a given, more or less specific,
partial production target rather than to the whole task. Thus, a technique of production,
no matter how rudimentary and primitive, appears as a decomposed process, as a
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sequence of relatively independent phases. If we consider a process of production, the
fact that it has been broken down into relatively well defined phases is the consequence
of an in-house division of labour. Although, each phase need not necessarily appear to
reflect a specialised body of knowledge, for phase decomposition may simply respond
to the need of shortening a given task to minimise blunders, it is nevertheless true that
through evolution independence and, more to the point, independent searching engender
knowledge specificity. Thus, while at the outset of the decomposition process, phase
specificity owes mainly to mere co-ordination and to the need of eschewing limiting
constraints, as independence is strengthened and as it becomes more entrenched, each
phase becomes more and more specialised with its own peculiar body of patent and tacit
knowledge, its tools, procedures and above all routines. In this sense, division of labour
generates division of knowledge.
Once a definition of technique currently in use is thus postulated, we may then
simply describe each phase as a collection of traits each of which takes a particular form
out of an empirically defined set. If we view even an extremely simple, pristine
economy through these lenses, its dynamics appear nested into three different
problematic layers. The first is, as a consequence of the phase independence postulate,
an evolutionary problem confined within the boundaries of each phase. The second is,
given phase specificity, an inter-phase co-evolutionary problem. The third amounts, by
lifting the analytical plane still higher, to the co-evolution among phase-structured
production processes or possibly firms within the economy. Let us take each of these
different analytical planes in turn.
The evolutionary process within a simple phase In each phase there are, in
general, N traits each of which comes with A characteristics fully describing the
technique being operated. A combination of the N traits, a sequence, is thus such a
description. An example may clarify this point. In phase α of a given process, the
elements which are apt to define the technique being used are the following traits: (i)
one machine, (ii) one type of labour and (iii) a co-ordination procedure: N=3. Each one
of these traits is currently present with a given characteristic: (i) the machine is of type
a, (ii) labour is ‘unskilled’, (iii) the co-ordination procedure is ‘top-down’. To any such
description corresponds an action, in this case a co-ordinated, collective action leading
to the execution of the tasks prescribed by phase decomposition. This bears a strong
analogy to the condition-action execution of TTT-like games. Two important points
must be made at this stage of the argument. Each trait is related to all other traits by a
complementarity relationship. The reason is straightforward: in terms of the example
which is made here, it is quite obvious that the kind of machine currently being used
conditions the type of labour being employed and vice-versa. The co-ordination rule, in
turn, is consistent with both. Thus, the performance of each trait, its contribution to the
whole, whether identifiable as such or not being immaterial, strongly depends on all
other traits. Given this, it is generally possible to establish overall performance in terms
of a productivity indicator as a consequence of the technical and organisational
characteristics in place. Each technique in each phase has, in this sense, a pay-off and is
the result of an evolutionary process in which change has occurred. Given this
environment, the general rules of the game with its legal possibilities or the body of
knowledge, we can in abstract postulate that existing traits lend themselves to a finite
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number of changes. These changes are predictable in the sense that knowledge is
discovered and acquired, as long as search and learning remain local, on a trajectory.
Machine a can change into machine b, c,d etc. Unskilled labour can become skilled of
type α,β,γ etc. Co-ordination can switch from a top-bottom to a bottom-up principle.
Thus, the N traits can actually appear in terms of a finite number of characteristics, let A
be such a number.. Each combination of traits bears a pay-off, that is to say a
productivity performance in the stage in which it occurs. This pay off and its probability
are unknown to searching agents, a direct consequence of their bounded rationality: they
must, therefore, explore the various combinations in order to strike a positive outcome.
This proposition is a statement on innovative activity. What triggers such an activity, at
least at this stage of our analysis, will not be discussed in detail. Economic and
behavioural literature abounds with theoretical and empirical recounts which uphold the
view that it is a process which is strongly endogenous to economic activity. We now
wish to discuss some formal characteristics. The searching problem is formally
analogous to the TTT game: at any given time, agents are faced with a condition- action
situation. Their performance is the outcome of the action taken when faced with the
production conditions set by technique and other environmental conditions. Such an
action is not necessarily predetermined in an unique way: variance occurs and learning
takes place in consequence. It is clearly possible to draw a landscape by connecting
points corresponding to combinations of traits.
Each trait combination is a technique and a corresponding action. They are both
conducive to a performance which depends in essence on the way traits are combined
and action taken. Whether the contribution of each trait with the taken characteristic can
be identified or not remains an open question. For neo-classical theory factors of
production contribute according to their marginal productivity. In this context, such a
coupling between specific traits and their particular performance contribution is not
necessary. If complementarity and interdependence are postulated, then pay-off change
whenever traits take on a different characteristic. In the NKC model, fitness changes
randomly: Each trait is randomly assigned a fitness value by a draw out of the unit
distribution; this value changes not only when the trait in question takes on a new
characteristic but also whenever traits to which it is linked through epistasis change. In
both cases, new fitness values are re-attributed by a new random draw. In ours,
performance, which is the equivalent of biological fitness, varies because innovation in
other traits cause imbalance in the structure of complementarities: limiting constraints,
mismatch of technical requirements, lack of co-ordination but also positive spill-overs,
learning and scale effects are all factors which either lower or enhance performance in a
deterministic sense. Thus, given a trait combination and assuming across-the-board
interdependence between traits, an innovative change in any of them which would
normally mean improvement per se, may change overall performance in any direction.
Which direction it turns out to be is largely an empirical matter. Since each trait
combination carries a pay-off and given that the latter changes completely even when a
single trait is modified, it follows that the resulting landscape is likely to be very
rugged.
The nature of searching on a landscape. In the context of a learning process,
searching is the means by which innovation is realised. An organisation attempts to
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bring forth improvements. Likewise, in the TTT game, players attempt to find out a
better sequence of moves, that increases the pay-off, until a strategy is consolidated. The
former does so by altering its traits and by so doing it ‘emits’ information. Searching,
however, does not escape the nature of activity as it results from past learning and the
ensuing emergence of routines and cognitive inertia. It is, in fact, the latter that limits
the range of searching to an adaptive process unless a major co-ordination effort lead it
toward a long jump. Uncoordinated search is adaptive in the sense that cognitive inertia
allows only for localised improvements, and for agents to focus on changing one
element among the many making up the organisation at any point in time. Adopting the
approach elaborated by theorists of rugged landscapes, searching is local and such as to
explore neighbouring alternatives, organisational set-ups in the case of production
processes or firms and close sequences of moves in the case of the TTT game. This
statement calls forth a more precise notion of neighbouring alternatives. Again, the
notion of neighbour in the NKC model proves useful.
1. A neighbour in this context is a ‘genotype’ or more generally a string of traits which
differs for a characteristic of only one trait (a trait exhibiting a differing allele). Now
consider a typical economic problem. Take the technical-organisational set-up of a
production phase. A neighbour is one such set-up differing from any given one for
the characteristic of only one of its elements. (for instance: machine type a,
‘unskilled labour’, ‘top-down’ organisational principle). Local search is an attempt
to discover designs that, because of specific knowledge and cognitive inertia, are
quite close. Each agent (or narrowly defined groups of persons) searches
independently ‘around’ the object that he or she controls, operates, manipulates or
otherwise handles: thus when he comes up with a discovery, quite likely it is the
only person to do so.
2. This proposition may be rendered in slightly more formal terms. At any point in
time, it is the discovery of only one characteristic to have the highest probability of
occurring. If: pi is the probability of an innovation in element i. then the probability
of a change of all elements is ∏i pi <pi. This result holds if the probability of a trait
change is the same for all traits ( pi=pj all i’s and j’s).There remains the probability
that ∏jpj, for j<N, be greater than pk for k not in 1,2 …j). It is, nevertheless, a
different matter if search is not independent but co-ordinated. Co-ordinated search
can make the probability of achieving an innovation on all or more than one element
(trait) plausibly higher: if co-ordination is pervasive then the sum of probabilities
applies.
Now consider the TTT game. Once rules are stated each player, when confronted
with the first initial board tries to discover a sequence of actions which seems to be
appropriate. How the discovery process takes place is a matter analysed in a huge
literature, initiated by Simon (1957, 1963), (see also Simon and Newell (1972)) in
which is suggested that one of the key mechanisms is the sub-goaling activity. Players
try to identify partial goals and to select a better fitting one. It is clear that this activity
has a large random component, due to the incomplete information available, and
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moreover to the limited ability of the players to process the available information.
Therefore the selection of a better division of tasks is a process with some random
features, and the same happens for the identification of the strategies to realise the tasks.
Suppose that, given a starting board, each player  identifies a provisional task and a
correlated set of rules of actions. It is likely that the provisional identification of action
rules, will be considered unsatisfactory. Therefore the division of tasks is changed - and
in consequence the sets of condition-action rules are modified - in order to improve the
performance of the players.
For any given board lay-out, new condition-action rules are explored and revised;
players’ activity is oriented to improve the fitness of their performance by modifying
the set of action rules. It is this set which is relevant and which is explored on account
of the fact that the game is repeated. Whenever similar boards appear, condition action
leads to search for improvement (shorter sequences)
These considerations provide two behavioural rules:
Rule A. Search is carried out by sampling in turn possible combinations of traits and it is
stopped as soon as an improvement is found; the initial combination is random or
historically given. Less efficient combinations are turned down (no adoption).
Rule B. Search is carried out by exploring neighbouring combinations.
These rules together with the pay-off structure outlined above provide a formal
method to assess exploration and innovative adaptation. Consider the following
elements:
1. The number of combinations over which search may be conducted is
1.1   S = AN
if each phase possesses a different number Aj, then
1.2   S = A1*A2*A3*..................*AN
2. A neighbouring combination is one which differs for only one trait. This proposition
gives content to the fact that since rationality is bounded and given cognitive inertia,
search is local. The number of neighbours which each combination of traits
possesses is
2.1   Nb = (A-1)N
Epistatic dependence must now be addressed. As argued above traits of a
combination are far from being independent. If this were the case, however, innovation
in one trait would not jeopardise the performance of the remaining ones. Thus
exploration of neighbouring sequences of traits would identify more performing
solutions. If a trait is changed (say a machine) and this is more performing, then the
entire technique would feature a higher pay-off. By discarding worse solutions, the most
performing technique and associated action would be found. This process is, indeed,
very similar to genetic hill-climbing of the Kauffman model. Trait independence insures
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that if search takes place eventually it will lead to discover the optimal solution by one
trait adaptive changes.
Proposition 1. Since each fitness value is independent and unless the chosen
combination is already optimal (exhibiting the highest fitness value), beginning
randomly from any of the potentially available combinations it is always possible to
find a neighbour with a higher fitness by random search
Epistatic influence changes this proposition. Complementarity and interdependence are
the rule within a phase: the performance contribution of each trait depends crucially on
other traits’. Assume that those linked by interdependence are H, the following are the
epistatically linked combinations.
3.1      SH = AH+1           H+1≤N
The important point is now that each performance varies in accordance to how
traits are combined. Furthermore there is no a-priori direction which this change is
likely to take. The consequence for innovative evolution is far ranging. In the previous
case, when independence was the rule, hill climbing from neighbour to neighbour was
sufficient to attain the optimum trait combination. Now a technically or organisationally
better trait may bring about worse overall results. Thus, by applying the rule of
searching randomly among neighbours (one trait mutants in genetic models), the path
towards improvements may sooner or later lead to a lock-in into a sub-optimal
combination. The space of combinations may allow for an optimal one and for ones
upping the score of the one just discovered but they all lie outside the neighbouring
space of combinations. A standard result of rugged landscape analysis is that when
epistatic interaction prevails, the potentially optimal combination may not necessarily
be reached. Starting randomly, improvement may end up in a less than optimal
situation, i.e. in a situation in which all neighbours have lower performance values than
the one already achieved and innovative activity may get locked-in on a suboptimal
performance peak depending on the search starting point. Path-dependency is a crucial
and powerful factor: if the economy happens to be on a historically given technical and
organisational set-up and on account of the necessarily local nature of the quest for
alternatives, it may end up in very mediocre capabilities.
An interesting question is: how many local optima (lock-in peaks) are likely to
exist. Take any point in the landscape. According to 2.1 such a point has Nb = (A-1)N
neighbours. The probability that such a point is a local optimum is the probability that it
has the highest performance value among its neighbours; hence, there is one favourable
case out of (A-1)N+1 possible ones:
4.1  Po = 1/ [(A-1)N +1]
Since there are AN such points, the number of expected local optima is the number
of points times the probability that each is a local optimum:
4.2  No = AN Po = AN / [(A-1)N + 1]
15
Note that No is an increasing function of N since A≤N.
Proposition 2. When epistatic dependence prevails, and especially in the case of
H+1=N (complete interdependence), the possibility of path-dependent, suboptimal
lock-in arises. The probability of lock-in increases with the dimension of possible
combinations: N.
The case of process lengthening. Innovation has, so far, been discussed in terms of
final productivity. As already argued in the introduction, this is not a general case.
Innovation introduces firstly a re-elaboration of co-ordination, new organisational
principles, and secondly new tools, machines, farm implements, more generally
instruments and means of production which do not only replace obsolete ones but which
increase the degree of mechanisation and must therefore be produced in appropriate and
specialised production As usual, they are specific, are the result of a successful
innovative search, are subject to learning, require particular production routines and
thus define a specific and progressively more specialised phase of production.. The
implication of deepening mechanisation or trait enrichment is straightforward: N rises.
Thus, if proposition 2 holds, the probability that this economy will get trapped in
mediocre performance levels rises accordingly. The economy will not be able to cross
over potentially more rewarding combinations as long as it remains trapped in sub-
optimal peaks. The strength with which this economy is capable to innovate and
generate applied technical progress depends on many factors on which we shall not
dwell upon here. As vigorously argued in the literature, technical progress is, at least in
part, endogenous and therefore subject to self reinforcing mechanisms. Accordingly, N
rises in time. But as it does, so does the probability of lock-in on account of increasing
epistasis. Note that with an increasing N, the number of search combinations rises,as 5)
clearly shows. There is, of course, more to innovate and more to co-ordinate. At the
same time, conflicting constraints also rise with N, H increasing with it.
There are further consequences which need to be considered. The first arises if
with increasing N, the outcome of innovative changes becomes increasingly random. If
this is the case performance levels become a random variable. Thus, with N sufficiently
high, combination pay-offs can be taken to be distributed as a normal distribution with
mean m and variance m/N: the central limit theorem applies. It can now be easily shown
that, as fitness values become fully random on account of epistatic interaction, the value
of local optima tend to regress towards the mean. The landscape becomes more and
more uniform as N increases, combined search directions leading to more and more
similar and progressively more mediocre results (Kauffman 1989). The second
consequence bears upon co-ordination capabilities. Each phase in this production
process is the result of problem decomposition into sub-problems: it is the outcome of
an effort to reduce complexity. As N rises, however, complexity increases and the task
of keeping a co-ordinated phase more difficult. Thus, productivity increases which
might otherwise be attained through the innovative effort are lessened owing to co-
ordination failures. These consequences produce a powerful result: a general tendency
towards mediocrity and similarity.
Co-evolution among phases. Since the production process is phase decomposed,
co-evolution among phases must now be considered. The process discussed above,
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however, lays the ground for co-evolution among different phases. Again, the results set
out below are mainly drawn from models of rugged landscapes reformulated to
accommodate another kind of interdependence, or epistasis. As in the case of species
which evolve on their own landscapes, here we are faced with the problem of phases in
which condition action, rule based activity takes place and innovation is successfully
sought. Each one of these phases is, as postulated above, operationally independent as a
way to cope with the complexity of the whole. It is nevertheless influenced by other
phases. There is, again, a straightforward case of inter-phase complementarity: the
simplest example is the output of one becoming the input of another. Reciprocal
influence can, however, be quite general whatever the nature of the linkage. The latter
can, without loss of generality, be made more precise by observing the trait combination
of each phase. Let for simplicity’s sake confine their number to two. In each point in
time, there is an extant technique and action taken in each one of them and, what is of
equal importance, change is about to occur owing to learning and searching. Let phase
α innovate by adopting a different characteristic in one of its traits (for instance
machine a is replaced by machine b ); while this event bears consequences in terms of
pay off within the phase in relation to its own internal epistasis, it is in fact a move on
its own landscape, it also carries an impact upon the functioning of one or more of
phase β traits if and when they adopt a specific characteristic among the possible ones.
By following the simple case proposed here, machine b in phase α helps to produce an
output that only highly skilled manpower can best handle in phase β. The latter,
therefore, will exhibit a different overall productivity pay-off according to its labour
force’s skills and to its paired phase adopting machine b. Phase β landscape is thus
reshaped by movements of phase α. This occurrence is in general reciprocal. As it can
be seen, the type of influence and relationship being discussed in this context resembles
closely that which players in TTT games have on each other: a move by one player sets
up a specific board which restricts the other player’s action. The implication is that
learning is thus thwarted to take a path it might not otherwise have taken and a direction
that locks-in in one rather than the other of the two canonical strategies. Returning to a
production framework, these considerations prompt the statement that there normally is
inter-phase epistasis which links up traits in combinations that the process of change,
i.e. innovation, brings about. The intensity of this reciprocal influence is determined by
the number of traits that are actually involved in epistasis. Let such a number be C. It is
important to note that, once a dimension of epistatic influence has been established, the
innovative movement by one phase impinges on the other’s and vice versa. Thus, if by
searching phase α has reached a local optimum on its landscape and is therefore locked-
in, searching by phase β may budge it out of the ‘trap’ shifting its performance on either
a lower or higher level. The same applies to phase β. Hence, the relationship between
the two phases hinges on the probability of each of reaching a lock-in peak and thus on
the relationship between internal epistasis, as measured by H, and the external one as
measured by C. Simulations run by Kauffman and Johnson 1995 provide some results
which are very relevant to co-evolution through innovation They can be summarised in
the following points.
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1. Given a time span and H for n phases matched pairwise (α with β, γ with λ etc.), as
external epistasis increases as measured by an increasing C, the proportion of pairs
which lock-in into equilibrium decreases. This is an important point but, as
mentioned above, movement can go both ways: performance can either improve or
worsen. Agents within each phase continue searching and will accept only improved
solutions (‘fitter’ combinations) only to witness their efforts being voided by the
search conducted by agents in the other phase, or being enhanced, as the case may
be. If phases were entirely operationally independent and therefore uncoordinated,
movement would be random. A direction of change may be imparted only by
strengthening co-ordination, i.e. by increasingly integrating phases. On a formal
plane, integrating phases into one implies increasing N, the number of traits, and, as
argued above, at the risk of worsening innovative efficiency and of bringing about a
mediocrity stalemate.
2. As a consequence of the previous point, as C increases average performance levels
reached by co-evolving phases decreases. This result holds since as long as both
continue in their attempts to change the more they will get, in a manner of speaking,
in each other’s way. Thus, if reciprocal influence is reasonably high ( C >1 ),
performance levels when a lock-in equilibrium is reached are higher than in the
period while searching goes on. Innovation, if looked at from this viewpoint, is a
two-edged phenomenon: it is the condition for improvement but it may also involve
the risk of losing and, in any case, of higher turbulence and adjustment.
3. If C is high and so is the risk of being upset by ‘partners’, high H phases, i.e. ones
with strongly interrelated traits, feature higher mean performance during the period
in which searching occurs before lock-in than low H phases. This is because high H
means higher probability of locking-in and thus of being less exposed to the changes
brought about by paired phases. Vice-versa, if C is low, low H phases fare better.
Independence pays in terms of diminished exposure.
4. Low H phases, when both reach equilibrium, exhibit higher performance levels than
high H ones, this being a straightforward consequence of the evolutionary
mediocrity implied by high H. Yet, when C is high, it is the high H ones which fare
better. This is the somewhat paradoxical result of the fact that mediocrity shelters
from exposure.
5. The higher is the number of co-evolving phases the longer it takes to lock-in into a
suboptimal peak: a mixed blessing given the uncertainty about the direction of
change of performance levels. Furthermore, if innovation occurs randomly, a higher
number of phases implies a drop in average performance levels; a clear indication
that only co-ordinated efforts become acceptable.
These results apply equally well if analysis is extended to deal with co-evolving
firms and production units. Co-evolution appears, in this analytical framework, as an
uneasy relationship.
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5. Division of labour and learning: final remarks
The conclusion drawn above indicates that phases’, or for that matter, firms’
performance relies heavily on the relationship between trait interdependence within and
without units which articulate division of labour. The measure of H and C and their
relative magnitude are crucial in determining the pattern of co-evolution. If H is too
high in respect to C, if internal epistasis dominates, lock-in into mediocre performance
is accordingly highly probable while the effects of the external linkage is too weak. If C
is too high in respect to H, the constraints which arise out of uncoordinated innovative
efforts become increasingly costly and harmful. Striking a fine balance between the two
factors is a matter for a fine tuning co-ordination between co-evolving partners.
Dysfunction does, indeed, occur because of disarray in co-ordination. But a more sober
and somewhat disturbing view of the process stems from the implication of rising
complexity within the unit of division of labour. A growing number of interrelated traits
brings about the danger of sliding down into mediocrity and easy lock-in into
suboptimal peaks: an event which has been dubbed by some authors a complexity
catastrophe. This is far from being an unlikely occurrence in an economic environment.
It is, in fact sufficient to observe that development fosters lengthening of production
processes through more roundabout, mechanised technologies. Thus, as phases or firms
get trapped into sub-optimality, the need to decompose, to spin-off parts to ease the
burden of problem solving becomes greater: in this sense the complexity stalemate is a
triggering device to further division of labour.
The framework provided by Landscape theory and the NKC model gives us some
new and partially unexplored perspectives for future research in understanding the
impact of distributed innovative activities into the division of labour and co-ordination.
The model, as well as an increasing experimental evidence induce to believe that
localised learning which takes place within any organisation, has endogenous limits :
this provides a cognitive explanation of the fact that to co-ordinate the activities of large
groups "formal" institutions arise within organisations.
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